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This article attempts to examine the relationship between the most important political
institutions and direct democracy in 23 modern OECD democracies by expanding Lijphart’s
concept of majoritarian and consensus democracy. The article updates Lijphart’s data
collection for the most recent period (1997–2006); it responds to criticisms of Lijphart’s
measurement of a number of variables and of case selection, and it integrates direct
democracy as an additional variable. Based on factor analysis, the main finding is that
there are not just two, but three dimensions of democracy in advanced democracies. The
horizontal dimension comprises the disproportionality of the electoral system, the number
of parties, the executive–legislative relationship, the interest groups, and the degree of
central bank independence. In the vertical dimension of democracy, we find federalism,
decentralization, bicameralism, the rigidity of constitutional provisions, and the strength of
judicial review. The top-to-bottom dimension of democracy comprises the type of cabinet
government and the strength of direct democracy. In contrast to earlier research, our
empirical analysis furnishes the hypothesis that direct democracy is not a variable that is
independent of all other political institutions. While active direct democracy goes hand-
in-hand with broadly supported multi-party governments, purely representative constitutions
frequently appear in conjunction with minimal winning cabinets.
Keywords: majoritarian democracy; consensus democracy; direct democracy; political
institutions; advanced democracies; Lijphart’s model of democracy
Introduction
Modern liberal democracies are based on two competing visions of the demo-
cratic ideal. On the one hand, the majoritarian principle emphasizes democracy as
government by the majority of the people, based on a concentration of power. The
consensus principle, on the other hand, promotes the idea that democracy should
represent as many people as possible and provide for multiple checks and balances
– thereby limiting the power of the central government while providing for the
representation of a broader array of interests. Although these democratic types
have been criticized by many scholars on conceptual, empirical, and normative
grounds (Kaiser, 1997; Bogaards, 2000; Schmidt, 2000; Armingeon, 2002; Tsebelis,
2002; Taagepera, 2003), Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) ground-breaking distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracies (based on his 10 features of
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democracy) undoubtedly represents the most influential and prominent typology
of modern democracies (Mainwaring, 2001).
Using Lijphart’s fundamental distinction between majoritarian and consensus
democracy as a starting point, this article aims to further develop its base in three
respects:
> In conceptual terms, our study encompasses a broader range of democratic
institutions. In addition to the executive–parties and federal–unitary dimensions
of democracy, we also include direct democracy, thus taking into account power
relations between the governing elite and the population. This aspect has hitherto
been neglected, but is becoming progressively more important.
> In methodical terms, we aim for a higher validity and reliability of Lijphart’s
(1999)democratic features. Both for reasons of comparability and due to the
strong significance of Lijphart’s types of democracy, our study focuses on
achieving a more valid and reliable measurement of those variables which have
been particularly strongly criticized in Lijphart (1999).
> Empirically, we perform an up-to-date examination of Lijphart’s dimensions of
democracy on the basis of the individual political institutions. We examine the
most recent period, which was not taken into account by Lijphart (1999) (i.e.,
the decade from 1997 until 2006) using a most-similar cases design. Our
empirical analysis concentrates on 23 advanced industrial democracies that
display a comparable degree of economic wealth.
According to Lijphart (1984, 1999), the two types of democracy ideally are
diametrically opposed with regard to power distribution. Majoritarian democracy,
with its bare majority cabinet, two-party system, disproportional system of elections,
unitary and centralized government, as well as additional elements, is, as a basic
principle, centered on the concentration of power. Consensus democracy, on the
other hand, stresses power sharing on the basis of a broad coalition cabinet,
a proportional electoral system, a multi-party system, federal, and decentralized
government, strong bicameralism, and other institutions. Although Lijphart’s (1999)
choice and measurement of individual features of democracy have recently been
disputed, Taagepera (2003: 14) rightly states that Lijphart’s (1999) prominent
typology of democracy and his empirical analysis of modern democracies ‘sets a
standard for work to come’. Therefore, in accordance with Lijphart’s terminology of
comparative institutional analysis (1999: 3) and following recent theoretical thought
on new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kaiser, 1997; Rothstein, 1998;
Grofman, 2000), the ‘institutional rules and practices’ of the advanced democracies
lie at the heart of our research interest.1 However, we expand the scope of these rules
and practices by examining a pivotal element in empirical democracy research: direct
democracy. Although often neglected, it forms the most democratic of decision
1 In other words, our study focuses not only on the legal ‘rules-in-form’ (formal institutions), but equally
on the ‘rules-in-use’ (informal institutions) which have centers over time (Weaver and Rockman, 1993).
126 A D R I A N VAT T E R
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773909000071
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:32:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
mechanisms and has increasingly gained importance at the beginning of the 21st
century. Today, more and more important questions are being decided by referendum
(e.g., recent constitutional changes in Australia, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy, as well
as ratifications of international treaties in the European Union), while institutional
provisions for referendums are increasingly being added to constitutions in many
countries (Scarrow, 2001; LeDuc, 2003; Hug, 2004; Qvortrup, 2005).
Lijphart’s (1999) factor analysis on the constitutional features and electoral
outcomes of 36 different democracies, produces two dimensions. The horizontal
dimension, he identifies, is the executive–parties (or joint-power) dimension,
comprising the degree of electoral disproportionality, the effective number of
parties, the frequency of single-party government, the average cabinet length,
and the interest group system. The vertical dimension, which Lijphart calls the
federal–unitary (or divided-power) dimension, encompasses bicameralism, federalism,
judicial review, constitutional rigidity, and central bank independence. Lijphart’s
(1984, 1999) finding, that the concept of direct democracy cannot be linked sys-
tematically with his two dimensions of democracy, has been recently confirmed by
Grofman (2000: 53). However, to date, there have been very few conceptual attempts
to connect Lijphart’s two models of democracy with direct democracy (see, Jung,
1996; Vatter, 2000). Even recent research on direct democracy (Suksi, 1993; Butler
and Ranney, 1994; Gallagher and Uleri, 1996; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002; LeDuc, 2003;
Qvortrup, 2005; Seta¨la¨, 2006) has only helped to confirm the conclusions reached by
Arend Lijphart (1984: 31) in his pioneering study: ‘the concept of direct democracy
cannot be regarded as either typically majoritarian or typically consensual’. There has
not yet been a successful connection of the basic concept of direct democracy,
both theoretically and empirically, with Lijphart’s two important models of
democracy in an international comparison. This paper aims to fill this gap and to
provide a convincing answer to the question raised by Lijphart (1999: 217), as to
whether referendums should ‘be seen mainly as majoritarian instruments or rather
as incentives for seeking consensus?’
The paper is organized in six sections. The following section develops a theoretical
connection between the most important features of Lijphart’s models of consensus
and majoritarian democracy on the one hand, and the main instruments of direct
democracy on the other. In the third section, our main hypothesis concerning the
relationship between Lijphart’s institutional variables and direct democracy will be
presented. The research design and the variable measurements can be found in
the fourth section. The fifth section focuses on the empirical analysis of 23 OECD
democracies, with a summary of our theoretical arguments and empirical findings
to follow in the sixth and final section.
Theoretical connections between majoritarian, consensus, and direct democracy
Before delving into the investigation, it should be noted that there is no definitive
answer to the question of possible connections between direct democracy and the
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two basic dimensions of democracy. This is due to the reality that the numerous
forms of direct democracy are too manifold and oppositional with regard to their
functions and effects. It is therefore necessary to first disaggregate referendums, as
they have both majoritarian and consensual characteristics. A convincing answer
can only be found if we attempt to classify the direct democratic institutions in
theoretical terms, subsequently connecting them to Lijphart’s two basic principles
of power sharing and power concentration (Jung, 1996; Vatter, 2000, 2002).
Although a number of classifications have recently been proposed (e.g., Suksi,
1993; Butler and Ranney, 1994; Hamon, 1995; Uleri, 1996; Seta¨la¨, 1999, 2006;
Qvortrup, 2000; Hug, 2004), most of these attempts come close to Smith’s (1976)
basic classification. In light of this fact, it seems reasonable to apply Smith’s first
criterion (1976), albeit in a slightly more specific form (i.e., to ask the question,
who has the right to launch a referendum). Using this criterion, we can derive two
basic types of referendums (see also, Jung, 1996; Vatter, 2000):
> Type 1: ‘Controlled (passive) referendums’: The government or a parliamentary
majority may launch a referendum.
> Type 2: ‘Uncontrolled (active) referendums’: Non-governmental actors, a
minority of voters or a parliamentary minority may initiate a referendum.
While plebiscites,2 and in some cases mandatory referendums,3 can be assigned
to the first direct democratic type which Hug (2004: 323) calls ‘passive refer-
endums’, optional referendums4 and popular initiatives5 correspond to Type 2.
The latter can be also designated ‘active referendums’ because of the active role
played by non-governmental actors (e.g., citizens) in launching them (Hug, 2004:
323). Given this basic distinction, it is now possible, at least in theoretical terms,
to establish an initial connection to Lijphart’s two concepts of democracy: as the
ruling majority has an exclusive right to call for plebiscites, these can be thought
of as having the typical features of majoritarian democracy. By contrast, we have
popular initiatives and optional referendums: these can be launched from the
bottom-up by a small minority of voters or parliamentarians, either to overturn
decisions made by the parliamentary majority (optional referendums), or to refer
2 The use of the term ‘plebiscite’ in the literature varies. The following explanations are based on the
definition by Suksi (1993: 10): a plebiscite ‘may be an ‘‘ad hoc referendum’’ for which there exist no
permanent provisions in the constitution or in ordinary legislation’.
3 Mandatory (or compulsory) referendums are those acts, which have to be referred to the voters by
the majority in government and parliament, as required by the constitution or other legally prescribed
norms.
4 An optional (or facultative) referendum refers to a ballot measure on a government proposal (e.g., a
law) which is held either due to demands from citizens or agents in the representative government (e.g.,
parliamentary minorities) (Gallagher and Uleri, 1996: 7; Seta¨la¨, 2006: 705).
5 ‘Popular initiatives mean that a certain number of citizens can demand a referendum by signing a
petition for a referendum on a legislative change promoted by the sponsors of the initiative’ (Seta¨la¨, 2006:
706). Only initiatives provide citizens with the opportunity to raise their own issues on the political
agenda.
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to voters’ propositions for laws or constitutional reforms (popular initiatives),
thereby circumventing the parliamentary and government majority. The mandatory
referendum, which is constitutionally required on a particular type of decision, is
located between these two types of direct democracy: on one hand, the government
can control the agenda of the mandatory referendum and grant considerable leeway
in interpretation, if the terms of the proposal are suitably vague, while on the other
hand, the government does not have much control over the initiation of a refer-
endum if the constitution automatically provides for a vote on a range of specified
issues.6 Therefore, following Seta¨la¨ (2006: 711), we can place the different forms of
direct democracy on a continuum from high (plebiscites), to medium (mandatory
referendums), to low (optional referendums and popular initiatives) ‘governmental
control’.
In order to achieve a more accurate taxonomy of the numerous forms of direct
democracy, we need to ask not only who initiates the referendum, but also who
has ultimate decision-making authority. So far, we have considered the potential
influence of governmental majority and non-governmental minorities only in
terms of the initial stages of the decision-making process. We therefore need to
continue by considering the rights of majorities and minorities during the final
decision phase. In concrete terms, this raises the question of whether the consent
of specific quorums is required for the acceptance of a referendum proposal. In
this respect, Jung (1996: 633) and Vatter (2000: 174) emphasize the substantial
difference between referendum decisions requiring qualified majorities, and those
which can proceed on the basis of a simple majority.
Provisions for required referendums frequently stipulate not only simple
majorities, but also the consent of qualified majorities. For example, in the federal
system of Switzerland, constitutional changes require a majority not only among
voters, but also among the cantons, which make up the Federation. As a result of
this ‘double majority requirement’ for constitutional referendums, a citizen’s vote
in the smallest canton Appenzell Inner Rhodes carries approximately 40 times
more weight than a citizen’s vote in the canton of Zurich. Therefore, the federalist
protection of minorities effectively means that small cantons ‘can organize a veto
to block democratic majorities’ (Linder, 1998: 159). In Australia, there is also a
‘double majority’ rule: a national majority of voters and a majority of voters in a
majority of the States (more than half of the voters in more than half of the States)
must vote in favor of a constitutional (mandatory) referendum proposal. In Italy,
however, a referendum outcome is only valid if the voter-turnout exceeds 50%.
In Denmark, a rejection of a bill transferring some aspects of national sovereignty
to an international organization is only valid if at least 30% of the eligible voters
reject the bill. If less than 30% vote against a proposal, the proposal is deemed to
have been accepted (Hug and Tsebelis, 2002: 479).
6 ‘The level of governmental control over mandatory referendums depends on the extent to which
governments have the authority to interpret the constitution’ (Seta¨la¨, 2006: 715).
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By considering majority–minority dimensions in terms of both the initiation
and decision phase of a referendum proposal, we are able to trace connections
between the most important forms of direct democracy and Lijphart’s two models
of democracy, as well as develop a ‘majoritarian-consensus’ classification of different
forms of direct democracy (see Table 1). While plebiscites with simple majority rules
belong to the majoritarian type of democracy, optional referendums and popular
initiatives requiring supermajorities display distinct consensus characteristics.
The latter are effective instruments that enable non-governmental actors to enforce
popular votes which may go against the will of the governmental majority, and
which may be regarded as typical power sharing instruments of consensus demo-
cracies. Initiatives and optional referendums (for which a simple majority rule
applies) are intermediate forms7: at the crucial stage of initiation, these instruments
display typical consensus features, whilst final decisions are made according to a
simple majority principle.
Main hypothesis
Following the logic of veto players theory (Hug and Tsebelis, 2002; Tsebelis,
2002; Hug, 2004), we can argue that the possibility of referendums introduces an
additional veto player, which makes significant changes in the status quo for the
government more difficult. In particular, as barriers for the restraint of the
executive, optional referendums and popular initiatives take on the function of
powerful veto players, which can delay or prevent governmental decisions,
thereby serving to shape the executive’s context of action in a significant way.
Table 1. A ‘Majoritarian-Consensus’ classification of different forms of direct
democracy with concrete examples
Governmental control
Decision rule
Government-initiated
(high control)
Constitutionally required
(medium control)
Initiated by a minority of
voters or MP (low control)
Simple majority Plebiscite (e.g., UK,
France)
Mandatory referendum
(e.g., Spain, Austria)
Optional referendum
(e.g., Denmark)
Simple majority
and quorum of
participation
Plebiscite (e.g.,
Nether-lands)
Mandatory referendum
(e.g., Ireland, Denmark)
Optional (e.g., Sweden) and
abrogative referendum
(e.g., Italy)
Qualified majority No example Mandatory referendum
(e.g., Australia,
Switzerland)
Optional referendum and
popular initiative
(e.g., Switzerland)
7 As mentioned before, mandatory referendums are also intermediate forms.
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Generally speaking, ‘uncontrolled’ forms of direct democracy introduce a new
veto player – the median voter of the population – into the political game and thus
block the choices of the ruling government (optional referendum) or upset their
priorities (popular initiative). Consequently, we can assume that the government
will do its best to reduce the uncertainty caused by uncontrolled referendums. A
rational strategy to lessen risks arising from the optional referendum and popular
initiative, is to widen the executive formula in order to encompass all parties
likely to make efficient use of the referendum, if not co-opted as partners in the
governing coalition (Neidhart, 1970). We therefore presume that the threat of
direct democracy from below leads to a boosting of executive power sharing. In
summation, we hypothesize a strong relationship between the type of government
cabinet and the consensual strength of direct democracy: more institutional pro-
visions of uncontrolled referendums lead to a more inclusive government coalition
in terms of party composition, which in turn leads to more oversized cabinets. In
other words, contrary to Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) and Grofman’s (2000) assump-
tions, we postulate the hypothesis that direct democracy – alongside the horizontal
and vertical dimensions – does not form an absolutely independent third dimension
of democracy; the individual forms of direct democracy (in accordance with their
majority-consensus characteristics) exist in a systematic relationship with the type
of cabinet, which was one variable of Lijphart’s first dimension of democracy
(executive–parties). On the other hand, we do not assume any connections between
direct democracy and Lijphart’s second dimension of democracy (federal–unitary).
In the following sections, we will examine this hypothesis.
Research design and measurements of variables
Our empirical research is based on a cross-sectional analysis of relationships
between the main political institutions in 23 advanced industrial democracies,
between 1997 and 2006. We start by using factor analysis to inquire into the most
important dimensions underlying political institutions in the 23 most established
democracies. Second, a graphic representation of a multi-dimensional matrix
(‘conceptual map of democracy’) of the 23 democracies further depicts the OECD
countries’ politico-institutional characteristics.
Drawing on Armingeon’s (2002) and Schmidt’s (2000: 348) criticism of Lijphart’s
(1999) selection of countries, we concentrate our analysis on economically similar
countries, namely, the 23 most developed OECD countries. In particular, Armingeon
(2002: 88) criticized Lijphart’s selection of 36 democracies with very different levels
of socio-economic development: ‘Botswana and Costa Rica are compared with the
USA and Switzerland’. This is problematic since political institutions and public
policies are shaped by the wealth of a nation. Consequentially, many more of the 36
selected countries with strong consensual elements belonged to the group of socially
and economically advanced democracies, whereas among the majoritarian demo-
cracies there were only few economically advanced countries. Thus, it seems ‘a much
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more prudent procedure to concentrate only on economically similar countries – the
OECD countries’ (Armingeon, 2002: 88). The systematic comparison of the most
advanced and wealthiest democracies not only has the advantage that it meets the
requirements of the most-similar systems research design (Przeworski and Teune,
1970; Lijphart, 1971), and therefore avoids ‘mixing up most similar and most
dissimilar case designs’ (Armingeon, 2002: 88), it also enables us to ensure that
our empirical findings are based on reliable data, which is often not available for
less developed countries (Lijphart, 2002: 109).
Table 2 lists the institutional variables, which we will consider in depth. Taking
Lijphart’s (1999) 10 attributes of majoritarian and consensus democracies as a
point of departure, we will now briefly introduce the variables used in our
empirical analysis. Keeping our theoretical considerations in mind, we pay special
attention to the measurement of direct democracy.
Party system
Like Lijphart (1999), we use the Laakso-Taagepera index (1979) to measure
the effective number of political parties in the respective parliaments. The
Laakso–Taagepera index takes into account the number as well as the strength
of the legislative parties and is one of the most widely used indicators for this
purpose (Armingeon, 2004). Systems with fewer legislative parties tend to be
more majoritarian.
Cabinets
Lijphart (1999) measures the concentration of executive power in terms of the
proportion of governments during a given period that were either minimal winning
or single-party cabinets. A greater proportion of minimal winning or single-party
cabinets increases the likelihood of a greater concentration of executive power and,
therefore, tends toward a more majoritarian political system. It should be noted that
Lijphart’s category of single-party cabinets includes both single-party minority
cabinets and single-party majority cabinets:
However, these are very different types of cabinets in terms of the consensus-
majoritarian logic. A minority government must share power with parliament,
as the opposition controls a majority of seats and can unseat the govern-
ment at any time. In order to pass legislation, a majority of MPs must vote
in favor of the government’s legislative proposals. A single-party majority
cabinet can largely neglect parliament, as long as the parliamentary party is
disciplined and MPs support their leaders in cabinet unconditionally (De Winter,
2005: 10).
Therefore, combining cabinets that work according to a consensual pattern
with those that work according to a majoritarian logic into a single variable, is
devoid of meaning. Starting from this criticism, we slightly modify the measure of
the concentration of executive power. In the case at hand, we aim to achieve a
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more valid operationalization for a majoritarian democracy, in order to focus only
on the duration of minimal winning cabinets and single-party majority cabinets
during the entire research period. Oversized multi-party coalitions, minority
Table 2. Variables, measurement and data sources
Variable Measurement Data Sources
1 Party system: two party systems
vs. multi-party systems
Effective number of legislative
parties (Laakso–Taagepera
index)
Armingeon et al. (2006), own
calculations based on EJPR
Political Data Yearbooks
2 Cabinets: concentration vs.
sharing of executive power
Percentage of minimal winning
and single-party majority
cabinets
Lundell and Karvonen (2003),
own calculations based on
EJPR Political Data Yearbooks
3 Executive–legislative
relationship: dominant
executive vs. executive–
legislative power balance
Combined index of the constitu-
tional strength of the legislative
and effective parliamentary
control capacities
Siaroff (2003) and Schnapp
and Harfst (2005)
4 Electoral systems: majority
and plurality methods vs.
proportional representation
Gallagher index of
disproportionality
Armingeon et al. (2006), own
calculations based on EJPR
Political Data Yearbooks
5 Interest groups: pluralism vs.
corporatism
Index of corporatism: sum of
centralization and coordination
of wage-setting arrangements,
trade union density, collective
bargaining coverage rate
(standardized scores)
Driffill (2006), OECD (2005)
6 Constitutional division of power:
unitary vs. federal government
Degree of constitutional
federalism (scale of 1 to 5)
Armingeon et al. (2006),
Lundell and Karvonen (2003)
7 Fiscal division of power:
centralization vs.
decentralization
Share of state and local taxes in
total tax revenue (in %)
OECD revenue statistics
8 Parliaments and congresses:
concentration vs. division
of legislative power
Scale of concentration of
legislative power (scale of 1
(unicameralism) to 4 (strong
bicameralism))
Vatter (2005), Flinders (2005)
9 Constitutional amendments:
flexible vs. rigid constitutions
Scale of the majority required
for constitutional amendment
constitution (scale of 1 to 10)
Lorenz (2005)
10 Legislative supremacy: absence
of judicial review vs. strong
judicial review
Scale of the degree to which
laws can be reviewed by
a constitutional court
(scale of 0 to 2)
Lundell and Karvonen (2003)
11 Central banks: dependence vs.
independence
Scale of central bank
independence (incl. ECB)
(scale of 1 to 9)
Sousa (2003)
12 Direct democracy: controlled
referendums vs. uncontrolled
referendums
Scale of the forms and use of
direct democracy (scale of 1
to 12)
See Table 3 in this article
ECB5European Central Bank.
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coalitions, and single-party minority cabinets are regarded as merely character-
istics of a consensus democracy.8
Executive–legislative relationship
Lijphart (1999) measures this variable in terms of the average cabinet duration, in
days, for the period in question. A more durable cabinet tends to increase the
likelihood of a more dominant executive (vis-a`-vis the legislature), and therefore
tends toward a more majoritarian system. However, it is obvious that the rela-
tionship between executive and legislative powers is theoretically, but not logically
related to Lijphart’s indicator. While an executive can be very stable and a loyal
delegate of the parliamentary majority, short-lived governments do in fact probably
indicate weak governments, but not necessarily strong parliaments (De Winter,
2005: 11). Their instability may be due to many other factors (see, Mu¨ller and
Strom, 2000). Furthermore, there are many formal and informal rules that con-
tribute to the power relations between executives and legislatures (agenda-setting
power, the rights of the parliamentary committees, etc.), and also tend to serve as
appropriate indicators for the executive–legislative relationship (Siaroff, 2003).
Therefore, it is not surprising that Lijphart (2003: 20) comes to the conclusion that,
of his 10 institutional variables, ‘the variable that gave me the most trouble [y]
was executive dominance’, and frankly admits: ‘I am not at all sure that the
operational indicator I develop in Patterns of Democracy is satisfactory’ (Lijphart,
2002: 110).9
Due to the strong criticism of Lijphart’s operationalization, we introduce a new
measurement of the power relationship between the executive and the legislative.
A valid measurement of the relationship between the executive and the legislature
must take both the constitutional position of the legislative vis-a`-vis the executive,
and the legislature’s actual possibilities of control into account. The variable
chosen to determine the relationship between the executive and the legislative is
based on a combined index, incorporating both the formal legal features of
Siaroff’s (2003) ‘executive dominance’ index and Schnapp and Harfst’s (2005)
effective parliamentary control capacities. Siaroff’s (2003) index pools 11 indica-
tors, which Siaroff defines as the factor ‘executive dominance over the legislature’
on the basis of factor analysis. These indicators include, for example, the degree
of government control of plenary agendas, the initiation of legislation, the ability
of committees to rewrite legislation, and the power of the prime minister.10 The
Schnapp and Harfst (2005) index is based on an extensive examination of the
8 See also, Kaiser et al. (2002: 319): ‘[M]inority cabinets have to be treated according to their actual
functioning. This means that – parallel to their higher inclusiveness – the chance of alternation they offer
is smaller than it appears at first glance’.
9 In particular, Lijphart (2003: 21) has in the meantime become convinced that Cabinet Life 1 is
‘simply not a valid indicator of executive dominance in presidential democracies’.
10 Siaroff’s index comes close to the (older) executive dominance measure developed by Shugart and
Carey (1992).
134 A D R I A N VAT T E R
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773909000071
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:32:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
effective control possibilities and information resources of the parliaments in two
dozen industrial democracies.11 Schnapp and Harfst (2005) combine the infor-
mation and control capacities measured for each parliament to form an additive
index, taking factors such as the number of staff at the disposal of members of
parliament, the size of the parliamentary scientific service departments, and the
number of permanent parliamentary committees into account. Our combined index
for the determination of the power relation between government and parliament is
formed by the standardized scores of the sum of Siaroff’s (2003) and Schnapp and
Harfst’s (2005) indices.
Electoral system
Like Lijphart, we use the Gallagher index of disproportionality to measure the
degree to which the electoral systems skew the relationship between votes and
seats in parliament: the greater the disproportionality, the more majoritarian the
electoral system.12
Interest groups
Lijphart (1999) uses an index of interest group pluralism developed by Siaroff
(1999) based on eight indicators and generates a comprehensive score for 24
countries ranging from 1 (highly pluralist) to 5 (highly corporatist). While some of
Siaroff’s indicators (1999: 195ff.) refer to formal and informal rules – such as the
recognition of peak organizations as social partners at trilateral negotiations and
as parties which are integrated into policy-making – others are clearly outcomes
of such rules, in particular the number of days lost by strikes. Moreover, the latter
are used, as such, by Lijphart (1999: 266ff.) in his analysis of the consequences of
institutional arrangements for economic outputs. As such, causes and con-
sequences are based to some extent on identical indicators, which clearly creates a
problem of endogeneity (De Winter, 2005: 11). Consequently, it seems advan-
tageous to use an indicator of corporatism, which does not rely on economic
output indicators. However, to date, corporatism researchers have been unable to
agree on a broadly accepted quantitative measurement concept; rather, there
exists a multitude of very different quantitative indicators of corporatism ‘which
have grown so numerous as to perhaps overwhelm even seasoned researchers in
the field’ (Kenworthy, 2003: 11). Nevertheless, a systematic comparison of 42
indicators of corporatism shows that all these indicators can at least be grouped
11 In the missing case of Iceland, the parliamentary control capacities were estimated based on
Kristjansson (2004) and other sources.
12 Here we follow Lijphart’s reply (2003: 21) to Taagepera’s (2003) criticism on his measurement of
electoral disproportionality: ‘[T]he most appropriate measure is simply the actual degree to which
elections yield proportional results – regardless of the reasons behind these results (such as the effective
threshold and other features of the formal electoral rules, the numbers and relative sizes of the political
parties, and various country specific factors). [y] Taagepera and I are in agreement on the suitability of
the Gallagher index’.
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into four categories according to their main focus: (1) interest group organization,
(2) wage-setting arrangements, (3) interest group participation in policy-making,
and (4) political economic consensus (Kenworthy, 2003). To avoid the endo-
geneity problem, we use a narrowly defined measure of corporatism that includes
the first three categories, but excludes the fourth (political economic consensus),
which is usually operationalized by strike rates (Kenworthy, 2003: 16). Our
corporatism index is comprised of the sum of the following standardized indi-
cators: trade union density (percentage of labor force consisting of members of
trade unions), the collective bargaining coverage rate (percentage of labor force
covered by collective agreement), and the centralization and coordination13 of the
wage formation process.
Constitutional division of territorial power
With reference to the recent debate on how to measure the territorial division of
power (Elazar, 1997; Watts, 1998; Castles, 1999; Keman, 2000; Rodden, 2004),
and in order to avoid confusing different concepts of vertical power sharing, we
depart from Lijphart’s (1999) one-dimensional measurement of federalism and
decentralization. Instead, we use two different scales to highlight this dimension –
namely, the federal–unitary scale, representing the constitutional indicators for
the ‘right to decide’, and the central–decentral scale, which indicates the extent to
which non-central agencies, in fact, have the ‘right to act’ (Keman, 2000: 199).14
The federal–unitary indicator measures the territorial distribution of power
between different levels of government forms embraced by the constitution,
ranging from 1.0 (unitary) to 5.0 (federal), and also takes the recent institutional
changes of territorial power in our sample of countries into consideration
(Armingeon, 2004).
Fiscal division of territorial power
We measure the degree of decentralization by means of an indicator of fiscal
decentralization developed in analogy to Lijphart (1984: 178) and also used by
Armingeon (2004), Castles (1999), Keman (2000), Schmidt (2000), and many
others. ‘This measure [y] is the simplest and most unambiguous measure of the
territorial decentralization of the fisc’ (Castles, 1999: 33). Fiscal decentralization
is equivalent to the proportion of state and local taxes in total tax revenue. The
tax-share measure is based on the reasonable assumption that the scope of the
activities of the central–state and non-central government can be measured in
terms of their revenues.
13 Soskice (1990) has argued in an influential article that researchers interested in the effects of wage-
setting and bargaining arrangements should focus not only on coordination, but also on centralization.
14 See, Keman (2000: 222): ‘[F]ederalism and decentralization are two distinct cross-national vari-
ables, which enable the researcher to categorize the cases under investigation in a more meaningful way
than is often the case in the literature’.
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Parliaments and congresses
For his measurement of the distribution of power within the legislature, Lijphart
(1999) uses three features (bicameral vs. unicameral; symmetrical vs. asymme-
trical; congruent vs. incongruent) in order to derive an index of bicameralism.
Lijphart’s scale ranges from 1.0 (unicameral), a majoritarian characteristic, to 4.0
(strong bicameralism), a consensus attribute. Here, we use an updated version of
Lijphart’s bicameralism index based on Vatter (2005).15
Constitutional amendments
According to Lijphart (1999: 219), the great variety of constitutional provisions can
be reduced to four basic types: approval of a constitutional reform by an ordinary
majority (1.0); approval by more than an ordinary but less than a two-thirds
majority or ordinary majority plus referendum (2.0); approval by a two-thirds
majority or equivalent (3.0); and approval by more than a two-thirds majority or a
two-thirds majority combined with other requirements (4.0). The major problem
with Lijphart’s index is the unsystematic consideration of referendums (see, Lorenz,
2005: 342ff.).16 In her index of constitutional rigidity, Lorenz (2005) combines
Lijphart’s scale with the systematic consideration of different voting arenas, implying
that non-parliamentary actors must be considered in a systematic way when they
explicitly have to consent to an amendment. Therefore, for the following analysis we
use Lorenz’s sophisticated index of amendment procedures (ranging from 1.0 to
9.5), which takes the different majority requirements, as well the different voting
arenas into consideration.
Judicial review
In order to measure the strength of judicial review, Lijphart (1999: 225) uses a
four-fold classification based first on the distinction between the presence and
absence of judicial review and second, on three degrees of activism in the assertion
of this power by the courts. In the case at hand, we use an updated version
of Lijphart’s scale, ranging from 1.0 (no judicial review), a majoritarian trait, to
2.0 (strong judicial review), a consensual characteristic based on Lundell and
Karvonen (2003).
Central bank
To measure the independence of central banks, Lijphart (1999: 235) uses the
mean value of the Cukierman–Webb–Neyapti, the Grilli–Masciandaro–Tabellini
15 For the UK, we also take the new bicameralism index score of 1.75 by Flinders (2005: 79) into
consideration.
16 Other problems exist: for example, in each case, Lijphart (1999) considers the least restrictive legal
method for making amendments (see, Lorenz, 2005: 342). However, many constitutions provide for
very rigorous procedures for the amendment of core sections, or simply make such amendments an
impossibility (e.g., Germany).
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and Central Bank Governors’ turnover rate indices, all of which are coded from
0 to 1 (i.e., from the lowest to the highest independence). However, Lijphart’s
overall index for the measurement of central bank independence displays a
number of weaknesses. For instance, it is partially based on out-dated data, does
not include the Grilli–Masciandaro–Tabellini index for half of the countries
examined, and does not take recent developments into account – particularly
the formation and strong influence of the European Central Bank (ECB). The
following analysis is therefore based on an up-to-date analysis of central bank
independence for all OECD states, which also records the degree of independence
of the ECB. Sousa (2003), in his new study, considers the staff-related, political,
economic, and financial dimensions of central bank independence and pools the
total of nine indicators in an overall index of the independence of each of the
central banks examined. For those countries which have joined the European
Monetary Union and where the national central banks have accordingly decreased
in importance, the value of the independence of the ECB is measured from the
time of the countries’ accession.17
Direct democracy
On the basis of our theoretical considerations, it is possible to compile an index of
direct democracy corresponding to the majority-consensus logic. In doing so, the
following applies: the more points awarded, the more consensual the direct
democracy in a country. Three criteria are decisive for the determination of the
direct democracy index:18
Governmental control: what instruments of direct democracy are provided for by
the constitution?. To answer this first question, we award one point for each basic
form of ‘uncontrolled referendums’ (optional referendums, initiatives) provided for
in the constitution. No points, however, are awarded for the plebiscite – the most
majoritarian popular right – which is by definition an ad hoc referendum, can be
initiated at the discretion of the head of government, and is often non-binding. The
intermediate form, the mandatory referendum, is valued at 0.5 points according its
medium level of governmental control. All in all, a maximum of 2.5 points is
possible if a country provides for the mandatory referendum (0.5) and the optional
referendum (1.0) as well as the popular initiative (1.0). An attenuated form of the
popular initiative in practice is known as the popular petition, or the agenda-setting
initiative (valued at 0.5 points), a petition, which must be processed by parliament
17 The following countries have been members of the European Monetary Union since 1999: Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Spain.
Greece has been a member since 2001.
18 The correlation coefficient between our index of direct democracy proposed here and the ‘IRI
Europe Country Index on Citizen law making 2002’ (Gross and Kaufmann, 2002) is 0.80 (statistically
significant at the 1% level; n518). This strong relationship should provide an indication of a valid
coding.
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but does not lead to a referendum. This form of citizen participation exists in
Austria19 and Spain.20 A further specific direct democratic feature is the Italian
abrogative referendum, which can be initiated by 500,000 citizens or five regional
councils. ‘There are no time limits between passing the decision and submitting it to
a referendum, Italian voters may veto other than recent parliamentary decisions. The
Italian abrogative referendum has in fact many characteristics similar to popular
initiatives, as it allows the electors to influence the political agenda’ (Seta¨la¨, 2006:
707; see also Uleri, 1996, 2002). For this reason, in the case at hand, we treat the
Italian abrogative referendum as a popular initiative. Finally, special forms of
optional referendums exist in Iceland and Greece, where the President can initiate
them if she or he refuses to ratify a project of bill (Uleri, 1996: 228). Due to this
majoritarian feature, the optional referendum in Iceland and Greece is not valued
in our index.
Decision rule: how are decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of a
referendum reached?. This question involves distinguishing whether a simple
popular majority is sufficient for the acceptance of a referendum, or whether
qualified majorities or the fulfillment of additional criteria are required. Here,
one point is awarded for each form of direct democracy if a qualified majority
(‘quorum of consent’) is required. The intermediate form of voter-turnout
requirement (‘quorum of participation’) is valued at 0.5 points.
Practical use: which instruments of direct democracy were effectively used in
practice over the course of last 10 years?. In line with Lijphart’s ‘institutional
rules and practices’ approach, we will not only examine the constitutional pro-
visions, but also the practical significance of direct democracy as well. Whether a
popular right is prescribed by the constitution but never exercised (e.g., due to
overly restrictive barriers regarding signature thresholds or circulation constraints),
or whether referendums are actually held and the population is able to regularly
influence governmental constitutional and legislative decisions directly is an
important distinction to make. In our index, we award one point for the effective
use, during the period from 1997 to 2006, of each basic direct democratic form
stipulated in the constitution (criterion: at least one referendum issue). Here, a
maximum of three points is possible if decisions were made via mandatory and
optional referendums, as well as via popular initiatives.
Table 3 provides an overview of the allocation of points for the 23 democracies
examined based on the index of direct democracy presented above.
19 100,000 signatures are required for a popular petition (Volksbegehren) in Austria to be forwarded
for processing to the National Council (First Chamber of Parliament).
20 The (so-called) Spanish People’s Legislative Initiative has the following characteristics: (a) it does
not lead to a referendum call; rather, it is merely designed to permit the people to submit, under some
circumstances, non-governmental bills to Parliament on a limited set of issues. (b) Section 87.3 of the
Spanish Constitution bans popular legislative initiatives for Organic Acts.
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Table 3. Index of direct democracy for 23 advanced democracies, 1997–2006
Ad hoc referendum (Plebiscite) Mandatory referendum Optional referendum Popular initiative
Country Exists Rule Use Exists Rule Use Exists Rule Use Exists Rule Use Total points
USA – – – – – – – – – – – – 0
Points – – – – – – – – – – – –
Germany – – – – – – – – – – – –
Points – – – – – – – – – – – – 0
Belgium – – – – – – – – – – – –
Points – – – – – – – – – – – – 0
UK X SM 0 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – – – – – – – 0
Canada X SM 0 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – – – – – – – 0
Greece X SM 0 – – – (X SM 0) – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – – – – – – – 0
Norway X SM 0 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – – – – – – – 0
Luxembourg X SM 1 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – – – – – – – 0
Japan – – – X SM 0 – – – – – –
Points – – – 0.5 0 0 – – – – – – 0.5
Iceland X SM 0 X SM 0 (X SM 0) – – –
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 – – – – – – 0.5
Portugal X PQ 3 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0.5 0 – – – – – – – – – 0.5
Netherlands X PQ 1 – – – – – – – – –
Points 0 0.5 0 – – – – – – – – – 0.5
Finland X SM 0 – – – X SM 0 – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – 1 0 0 – – – 1
France X SM 2 – – – X SM 0 – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – 1 0 0 – – – 1
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Table 3. (Continued)
Sweden X SM 1 – – – X PQ 0 – – –
Points 0 0 0 – – – 1 0.5 0 – – – 1.5
Spain X SM 1 X SM 0 X SM 0 (X SM 0)
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 2
Austria X SM 0 X SM 0 X SM 0 (X SM 13)
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 2
Ireland X SM 0 X PQ 10 – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 – – – – – – 2
Australia X SM 0 X QM 2 – – – – – –
Points 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 – – – – – – 2.5
New Zealand X SM 1 X SM 0 X SM 2 – – –
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 – – – 2.5
Denmark X SM 0 X PQ 2 X SM 0 – – –
Points 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 0 – – – 3.0
Italy X SM 0 – – – X SM 2 X PQ 21
Points 0 0 0 – – – 1 0 1 1 0.5 1 4.5
Switzerland – – – X QM 21 X SM 30 X QM 43
Points – – – 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7.5
Legend: First rows (per country): X: exists; SM: simple majority required; PQ: quorum of participation required; QM: qualified majority
(quorum of consent) required; Numbers: number of corresponding referendum (plebiscite; initiative) issues; –: does not exist/apply. Second
rows (per country): points awarded. Sources: Hug and Tsebelis (2002); Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy,
University of Geneva, 2007.
Sample calculation (example): In Switzerland, mandatory (0.5 pt.) and optional referendums (1 pt.), as well as popular initiatives exist
(1 pt.). Mandatory referendums and popular initiatives are decided by qualified majorities (1 pt. each); optional referendums by simple
majority (0 pt.). All these instruments of direct democracy have been used at least once (1 pt. each). Plebiscites do not exist (0 pt.).
The total sum of points assigned to Switzerland is 7.5.
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Empirical results
The main question that now arises is whether relationships can be observed
between the most important political institutions in the advanced democracies.
The appropriate method for investigating a set of variables with an ordering
structure is factor analysis. Factor analysis allows individual variables, by virtue
of their correlations, to be classified into independent groups. This statistical
procedure allows us to isolate one or more underlying dimensions of the different
variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978).
Table 4 presents the results of the factor analysis with our 12 variables.21 The
research period covers the years 1997 to 2006; the units examined are the 23 most
advanced democracies. The values specified for each variable indicate the factor
loadings, which can be interpreted as correlation coefficients between the variable
and the first, the second, and the third factors.
The central outcome of the factor analysis is the emergence of three unrelated
factors, each of which encompasses a group of variables. The three groups of
variables exhibit high factor loadings within, as well as low loadings outside their
Table 4. Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix of the 12 institutional
variables in 23 advanced democracies, 1997–2006
Variable Factor I Factor II Factor III
Effective number of legislative parties 0.62 0.06 0.39
Electoral disproportionality 20.83 20.08 20.01
Executive–legislative relationship 0.70 0.38 0.06
Interest group corporatism 0.81 20.26 20.03
Central bank independence 0.56 20.36 0.19
Federalism 20.07 0.89 20.03
Decentralization 0.08 0.74 0.14
Bicameralism 20.27 0.80 0.17
Constitutional rigidity 0.26 0.72 20.11
Judicial review 20.05 0.65 20.10
Oversized cabinets 0.12 20.12 0.84
Direct democracy 0.04 0.12 0.82
Note: The factor analysis is a principal component analysis with eigenvalues over
1.0 extracted (Kaiser criterion).
21 The factor analysis chosen here is a principal component analysis with orthogonal, rotated factor
loadings in accordance with the Varimax Criterion. Principal component analysis is the most frequently
used technique for the determination of factors. In principal component analysis, the coordinate system,
with the factorizing characteristics is rotated so that new axes emerge, successively explaining maximum
variance. The orthogonal (right-angled) rotation technique ensures that the factors are independent of
each other (reciprocally uncorrelated). Rotation using the Varimax Criterion causes the factors to be
rotated in such a fashion that the variance of the squared loadings per factor is maximized.
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own group. The strongest variable in the first factor dimension is the dis-
proportionality of the electoral system, which correlates very highly with the first
factor, followed by interest group corporatism and the executive–legislative rela-
tionship. The number of parties and the degree of central bank independence stand
in a somewhat less, but still comparatively strong relation to the first factor. In the
second dimension, the federalism and bicameralism variables prove to be the
strongest features, followed by the decentralization indicator, the rigidity of con-
stitutional provisions, and the strength of judicial review.22 The third and smallest
factor encompasses two variables, namely, the percentage of oversized multi-party
cabinets and the consensual strength of direct democracy. With 0.84 and 0.82,
respectively, both variables correlate strongly with the third cluster. It is worth
mentioning that the results are not driven by the special case of Switzerland. When
Switzerland is dropped from the factor analysis, the factor loadings between type of
cabinet, direct democracy, and the third factor are still 0.80 and 0.77, respectively.
Further robustness tests (Scree-Test, test on linearity, tests on further outliers) show
that the results proved in fact to be very robust. Finally, the correlation matrix for
all 12 variables (see Appendix 2) reveals overall patterns, which generally corre-
spond to the findings of the factor analysis. Not surprisingly, there are exceptions
such as a statistically significant correlation between the effective number of par-
liamentary parties and the (oversized and minority) type of government cabinet
(0.42). In fact, its correlation with direct democracy is only slightly higher (0.46).
What can be interpreted from the findings? The most evident result is the fact
that if we take direct democracy into account, not only two, but three dimensions
in established democracies emerge. Nevertheless, in contrast to the findings of
earlier research (Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Grofman, 2000), the empirical results seem
to confirm that direct democracy is not a variable that is independent of all other
political institutions, but rather connected to the type of the cabinet government,
and – to a lesser extent – to the number of parties. In short, the more developed
the institutions and the use of direct democracy, the more likely there are to be
broadly supported multi-party coalitions in the countries examined.
In the case of the horizontal dimension of democracy, two results are of par-
ticular interest. First, it has been shown that even a completely different (and
hopefully more valid) measurement of the power relationship between the
executive and the legislature reveals results similar to Lijphart’s (1999). A
balanced relationship between the executive and the legislature corresponds to a
proportional electoral system and a high number of parties in parliament. The
second notable result is the positioning of central bank independence in the
horizontal dimension of democracy, whereas in Lijphart’s (1999) factor analysis it
was allocated to the federal–unitary dimension. As such, the present result is also
22 All variables reach the level determined by Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis (2003) as the
critical threshold value 0.35 (0.5, respectively), and can therefore be described as reliable components of
their factor dimensions.
Three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries 143
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773909000071
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:32:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
more consistent with Lijphart’s original conception of the two democratic
dimensions:
My own initial view of the differences between the two dimensions, reflected in
the labels that I attached to them, was that the first is a horizontal dimension of
institutions operating at the central level, and that the second is a vertical
dimension having to do with central–regional–local government relations. Because
central banks operate at the central level and appear to have little to do with the
vertical dimension, my expectation was that central banks would belong to the
executives–parties. But the empirical analysis showed a strong relationship with
the cluster of four federal–unitary characteristics instead (Lijphart, 2003: 23).
The present analysis makes clear that Lijphart’s initial theoretical considerations in
this respect can be empirically confirmed for the most recent data, albeit with an
important amendment: besides a horizontal institutional structure on the central–
state level and a vertical, that is federal dimension, modern democracies also include
a third, top-to-bottom power relation dimension, that is the relationship between the
government and the population.
The factor analysis which we have carried out, affords us profound insights into
the different dimensions of advanced democracies and conveys much information
concerning the latter’s most important characteristics. However, the analysis does not
yet show the exact location of each country (relative to the others) on the three
mutually independent dimensions of democracy. A precise and appropriate way of
answering this question would be to graphically represent the three dimensions on a
conceptual map of democracy – as Lijphart (1999: 248) has already done.23 Figure 1,
in the form of a so-called bubble plot (Jacoby, 1998), represents the countries’
locations on a conceptual map formed by the 12 variables along with the three
dimensions. The characteristics of the five variables of the horizontal and the vertical
dimension can thus be used to place each of the 23 democracies on the conceptual
map of democracy shown in Figure 1. The first dimension of horizontal power
(‘parties–interest groups dimension’) is located on the abscissa, the vertical power
dimension (‘federal–unitary dimension’) on the ordinate. Both axes vary between
strongly majoritarian (positive values) and strongly consensual (negative values).24
The third dimension (the ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension) is represented by
the size of each bubble, which shows the data point’s relative importance. A large
bubble represents high values in the third dimension and corresponds to an active
direct democracy and oversized multi-party cabinets, whereas a small bubble cor-
responds to a purely representative democracy and minimal winning cabinets in the
given period. The exact (z-transformed) scores of each of the 23 countries on the
three dimensions can be found in Appendix 1.
23 This requires a z-transformation of the factor values of the variables in order to make them
comparable with each other.
24 In order to apply the factors to three dimensions, it was necessary to adjust the signs of the
individual variables (see also, Lijphart, 1999: 247).
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What new insights does Figure 1 afford us compared to Lijphart’s (1999) two-
dimensional map of democracy? Despite recent devolutionary processes in the UK,
the UK continues to be a pure example of the Westminster model, while New Zealand
(the only more unitary country than the UK) has, due to the introduction of the
proportional electoral system in 1996, progressively become a mixed-type in the
horizontal dimension, encompassing both majoritarian and consensus elements
(Nagel, 2000). In terms of the first two dimensions, the prime example of a consensus
democracy within Lijphart’s (1999) concept is Belgium, which has in recent years
further developed its already exceptional position as a strongly federal state. However,
in contrast to Lijphart (1999), Switzerland no longer corresponds to the prototype of
a consensual-federal democracy in the first two dimensions. In the horizontal
dimension, eight (of 23) countries achieve higher consensus values than Switzerland,
while in the vertical dimension, five countries achieve higher values. An important
reason for this result is that the present study, with its focus on direct democracy,
includes a very important institutional arrangement of Swiss democracy, which,
together with the type of cabinet, forms a third dimension. Although Switzerland is
an average case of a consensus democracy in the first two dimensions, it represents a
prime example of a direct democratic power sharing democracy. The relevant anti-
podes in the third dimension are purely representative democracies (at the national
level) with minimal winning cabinets such as Germany, the USA, and the UK.
Conclusions
Two conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the most important political
institutions in advanced democracies:
First, our empirical results suggest that in consolidated democracies, there exist
more than the two well-known dimensions of Lijphart’s model of democracy.
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Figure 1 The three-dimensional conceptual map of democracy
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Strikingly, the central outcome of our factor analysis is the emergence of three
largely unrelated factors. The (first) horizontal dimension of democracy comes close,
but is not identical to Lijphart’s executive–parties dimension. This dimension
includes an entirely new measurement of the executive–legislative relationship, as
well as central bank independence, and excludes the type of cabinet government.
Because central banks operate at the national level, this result is more consistent
with Lijphart’s initial distinction of a horizontal–vertical contrast (Lijphart, 2000:
236). The second factor is almost identical to Lijphart’s federal–unitary dimension
and includes federalism, decentralization, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity,
and judicial review. We can thus label the second factor the vertical dimension of
democracy, as it deals with central–regional government relations. Finally, the most
interesting result is the existence of a third factor, which we call the top-to-bottom
dimension of democracy. This third dimension comprises two political institutions,
the type of cabinet government and the strength of direct democracy. In contrast to
the findings of other studies to date (Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Grofman, 2000), our
study reveals that direct democracy is not a political institution independent of all
other features of democracy; rather, it exists in relation to the type of the government
cabinet, and – to a lesser extent – to the number of parties.
In line with the neo-institutional approach, it seems that with the increased veto
potential of direct democracy and the ensuing unpredictability for the respective
government, the increased institutional provisions for referendums in advanced
democracies and their growing use by non-governmental actors in recent years,
created institutional pressures towards more power sharing in the executive. In
the case of Switzerland, the development of popular rights has admittedly led to
the continuous integration of the main political parties into a government coali-
tion and weakened the parliament. In the quest to minimize the risks harbored by
direct democracy, the informal search for a broadly supported compromise has
required the formation of broadly supported multi-party governments, which
make the important decisions. Extensive power sharing in the Swiss government is
intended to produce solutions acceptable to a sufficiently large majority in par-
liament, for the risk of optional referendums and popular initiatives to be reduced
(Neidhart, 1970; Steiner, 1974, 2002; Linder, 1998). In short, the co-optation
strategies over the years by the political actors in order to minimize the risks
harbored by direct democracy, gradually transformed the Swiss referendum
democracy into a consensus democracy with broadly supported multi-party
government coalitions. However, we should be cautious suggesting a strong
causal relationship between direct democracy and cabinet type in general. While
the causal relation between direct democracy and oversized coalitions appears a
valid explanation especially for Switzerland (and Liechtenstein), the frequency of
oversized coalition in Italy and Denmark may be more explained by the frag-
mentation of the party system. Nevertheless, according to country experts, the
recent integration into government of such parties as the Partito Radicali, Lega
Nord, and Verdi in Italy (2005/06) as well as the Conservative Party and the
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Radical-Liberals in Denmark in the 1980s, occurred especially in order to prevent
these opposition parties from their growing and effective use of referendum cam-
paigns to block government legislation (Svensson, 1996; Uleri, 2002).
Second, how can the present results be integrated into the current findings of
empirical democracy research? Initially, our results underline, for the most recent
period, the continuing theoretical and empirical relevance of the horizontal and
vertical power sharing dimensions in established democracies as described by
Arend Lijphart (1984, 1999). At the same time, our results make clear that the
inclusion of a direct democracy can lead to an extension and differentiation
of Lijphart’s concept of representative majoritarian and consensus democracy.
Such an extension and differentiation not only accounts for new developments,
such as the increased significance of referendums in modern democracies, but
also counters certain researchers’ criticism of Lijphart that consensus democracies
are de facto oligarchical elitist democracies without any direct influence by the
people. Evidently, in reality there exist two different prototypes of consensus
democracies with different power sharing strategies: on one hand, the parlia-
mentary-representative type, which is decisively influenced by the search for
compromises by the elected party leaders in the parliamentary arena (e.g., Belgium);
and on the other hand, there is the direct democratic type, which is characterized by
the broad integration of political forces into the government due to the pressure
exercised by instruments of direct democracy (e.g., Switzerland). In this sense, we
agree with Kaiser’s (1997), Kaiser et al. (2002) critique25 of Huber, Ragin, and
Stephens (1993) and Schmidt’s (2000) one-dimensional frameworks of counter-
majoritarian institutions. In the present case, it seems similarly unwise simply to
tally up the institutional veto points, as this would cause a practical disappearance
of the different dimensions of power sharing and the specific interaction of insti-
tutions in the advanced democracies. Theoretically, as well as empirically, it seems
more useful to allow for the variety of institutional arrangements in the advanced
OECD countries by differentiating between at least three different dimensions of
democracy. Taking these different dimensions into account provides us with a more
complex, but also an overall more realistic picture of the diversity of modern
democracies.
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Appendix 1 . Twelve institutional variables of 23 Advanced Democracies, 1997–2006
Country
Effective number
of legislative
parties
Oversized and
minority cabinets
(%)
Index of
executive–legislative
relationship
Gallagher Index of
disproportionality
(%)
Index of interest
group
corporatism
Index of
constitutional
federalism
Australia 2.47 11 22.38 10.04 21.59 5.0
Austria 3.19 0 1.05 1.76 1.92 4.5
Belgium 8.16 44 0.4 3.63 2.99 5.0
Canada 2.80 22 22.05 12.57 24.84 5.0
Denmark 4.58 78 1.33 0.65 2.54 2.0
Finland 5.01 100 1.08 3.15 5.64 2.0
France 2.92 100 21.81 19.98 21.90 1.3
Germany 3.35 0 1.74 3.00 1.21 5.0
Greece 2.25 0 21.4 7.76 0.69 1.0
Iceland 3.65 0 1.78 1.44 2.84 1.0
Ireland 3.18 33 22.2 6.45 2.65 1.0
Italy 5.73 78 1.43 6.67 0.43 1.5
Japan 2.94 100 1.36 9.68 23.38 2.0
Luxembourg 4.12 0 21.89 3.38 0.52 1.0
Netherlands 4.98 44 0.45 1.01 0.75 3.0
New Zealand 3.65 89 21.85 2.61 25.32 1.0
Norway 4.85 89 0.49 3.25 3.47 2.0
Portugal 2.58 22 20.25 5.22 1.66 1.0
Spain 2.56 56 0.83 5.68 20.39 3.0
Sweden 4.18 100 1.32 1.00 2.84 2.0
Switzerland 5.22 100 0.32 2.93 21.79 5.0
UK 2.15 0 21.92 17.1 24.78 2.5
USA 2.01 0 2.17 2.52 26.17 5.0
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Appendix 1. (Continued)
Country
State and local taxes in
total tax revenue (%)
Index of
bicameralism
Index of constitutional
rigidity
Index of judicial
review
Index of central
bank independence
Index of direct
democracy
Australia 22.4 4 8 2 2.66 2.5
Austria 20.9 2 3 2 6.86 2
Belgium 14.1 3 9.5 2 6.29 0
Canada 44.1 3 7 2 2.33 0
Denmark 31.2 1 8 1 4.99 3.0
Finland 23.0 1 4 1 7.16 1
France 9.9 3 4 2 6.83 1
Germany 29.1 4 6 2 6.83 0
Greece 1.2 1 5 1 6.68 0
Iceland 20.8 1 8 1 5.08 0.5
Ireland 2.3 2 4 1 6.72 2
Italy 5.4 3 4 2 6.97 4.5
Japan 24.9 3 8 1 4.41 0.5
Luxembourg 7.6 1 5 0 6.77 0
Netherlands 2.6 3 8.5 0 6.81 0.5
New Zealand 5.7 1 1 0 4.99 2.5
Norway 19.6 1.5 3.5 1 3.41 0
Portugal 5.6 1 3 1 6.83 0.5
Spain 13.8 3 6 2 6.66 2
Sweden 31.8 1 4 1 6.91 1.5
Switzerland 36.1 4 7 0.67 6.52 7.5
UK 4.1 1.75 1 0.33 3.66 0
USA 32.1 4 9 2 3.83 0
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Appendix 1. (Continued)
Country
First dimension
(parties–interest
groups)
Second dim.
(federal–unitary)
Third dim.
(cabinets–direct
democracy) Country
First dimension
(parties–interest
groups)
Second dim.
(federal–unitary)
Third dim.
(cabinets–direct
democracy)
Australia 21.58 1.40 20.14 Japan 20.64 0.39 0.55
Austria 0.67 0.31 20.44 Luxembourg 0.10 21.26 21.15
Belgium 1.40 1.16 20.53 Netherlands 0.84 20.23 20.24
Canada 21.93 1.52 20.84 New Zealand 20.77 21.72 0.97
Denmark 0.77 0.07 1.38 Norway 0.33 20.53 0.11
Finland 1.33 20.52 0.55 Portugal 0.11 21.15 20.56
France 21.21 20.10 0.55 Spain 0.06 0.47 0.35
Germany 0.69 1.33 21.15 Sweden 1.04 20.34 0.84
Greece 20.41 21.03 21.15 Switzerland 0.48 1.10 2.55
Iceland 0.67 20.31 20.87 UK 22.04 21.22 21.15
Ireland 20.13 20.89 0.17 USA 20.63 1.70 21.15
Italy 0.85 20.16 1.38
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Appendix 2 . Correlation matrix for 12 institutional variables in 23 advanced
democracies, 1997–2006
Variable 1: Effective number of legislative parties Variable 7: Decentralization
Variable 2: Executive–legislative relationship Variable 8: Bicameralism
Variable 3: Electoral (dis)proportionality Variable 9: Constitutional rigidity
Variable 4: Interest group corporatism Variable 10: Judicial review
Variable 5: Central bank independence Variable 11:Oversized and minority cabinets
Variable 6: Federalism Variable 12: Direct democracy
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
[1] 1.00
[2] 0.30 1.00
[3] 0.42* 0.59** 1.00
[4] 0.50** 0.35* 0.48* 1.00
[5] 0.34* 0.23 0.30 0.54** 1.00
[6] 0.09 0.18 0.06 20.26 20.30 1.00
[7] 0.01 0.39* 0.18 20.12 20.38* 0.61** 1.00
[8] 20.01 0.11 20.22 20.33 20.19 0.75** 0.35* 1.00
[9] 0.24 0.36* 0.23 20.01 20.20 0.50** 0.44* 0.51** 1.00
[10] 20.07 0.24 20.22 20.01 20.09 0.52** 0.37* 0.55** 0.30 1.00
[11] 0.42* 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.16 20.24 0.15 20.05 20.11 20.13 1.00
[12] 0.25 0.07 0.16 20.03 0.20 0.11 0.16 0.24 20.03 20.01 0.46* 1.00
*Statistically significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test).
**Statistically significant at the 1% level (one-tailed test).
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